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BEARINGS BEPORE 'mE SBHATE COllllBRCB COKIIITTBE 
SUBCOIIIIITTBB ON COJDmNICATIONS 
HELD SBPl'BllBBR 15, 1989 
.f ~ EVOLtJ'l'IOB OF DISTRESS SALES: 
~A Direct Benefit to Non-~orities 
ORAL 'l'ESTDlONY OP 
J. CLAY SKITS, JR. 
ON BEHALP OF RATIONAL BAR ASSOCIA'l'IONll 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a pleasure to be here today before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Communications to discuss the state of minqrity 
ownership of broadcast facilities as relates to recent actions by 
the FCC and the court. A public discussion of this topic is 
quite timely in light of recent decisions by the D.C. Circuit of 
the u.s. Court of Appeals dealing directly with the validity of 
FCC's minority enhancement policies and its distress sale 
." 
~/ National Bar Association was founded in 1925, and is an 
organization comprised of Black lawyers across the United 
States. The National Bar Association has, for the last 
forty years, actively participated in the formation of the 
nation's telecommunications policy. J. Clay Smith, Jr., 
Esq. is currently a Professor of Law at Howard ;University 
School of Law in Washington, D.C. In preparing his oral 
testimony, Professor Smith was assisted by Err9ll D. Brown, 
Esq., currently an associate at O'Malley, Miles and Harrell 
in Landover, Maryland, Cynthia Mabry, Esq., currently an 
associate at Crowell and Moring in Washington, D.C., and 
Lisa C. Wilson, Esq., currently an associate at Fisher, 
Wayland, Cooper and Leader in Washington, ·D. C • All views 
expressed are those of the authors and of the National Bar 
Association, and do not express the views of the authors' 
respective employers. 
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policy.~/ Because of the D.C. Circuit's recent decision to 
invalidate the distress sare policy on equal protection grounds, 
these comments will focus specifically on this policy alone.~/ 
It is genlrallY settled that an agency's decision not to 
prosecute or to exercise its administrative enforcement authority 
is a matter of agency discretion. The Supreme Court itself has 
recognized the nqenera1 unsuitability for judicial review of 
agency decisions to refuse enforcement." Heckler y. Chaney, 470 
u.s. 821, 831 (1985). For example, the Commission is vested with 
the power to grant a broadcast license without a hearing if it is 
",' 
able to make the finding that to do so results in "the more 
efficient use of the broadcast spectrum." Absent specific 
guidelines to determine a precise definition on the "efficient 
use of the broadcast spectrum," the Commission is left to its own 
devices on how to pursue its public interest mandate. 
In'''May, 1978, the Commission issued a "Policy Statement on 
£/ See, Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, No. 88-1755 
(D.C. Cir. April 21, 1989) (held, awarding qualitative 
enhancement credit to broadcast applicants that have 
minority ownership does not violate the equal protection 
clause of the Fifth Amendment); Sburberq Broadcasting of 
Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, No. 84-1600 (D.C. Cir. ~rch 31, 
1989) (held, distress sale policy violates F1f~h Amendment 
because program not narrowly tailored to reme~ past 
discrimination or to promote program diversity). 
~/ For a legal analysiS of the Commission's minority and gender 
enhancement policies, see Wilson, "Minority and Gender 
Enhancements I A Necessary and Valid Means to Achieve 




Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities. llj/ In issuing the 
Policy Statement, the Commission exercised its administrative 
enforcement discretion by introducing a measure whereby non-I, . 
minority licen~es, who were either facing a revocation hearing 
or who have had issues designated against their renewal 
application significant enough to warrant a hearing, could opt to 
sell their stations rather than run the risk of engaging in the 
hearing where they could be stripped of their license altogether. 
This policy is referred to as the "distress sale policy." 
The distress sale policy as adopted in 1978 was' not unique 
'" because since at least 1966, the Commission had authorized the 
assignment of licenses in some instances where there were 
outstanding issues involving the qualifications of the licensee. 
Assignments such as these were and are now per.mitted in 
circumstances where the licensee is either bankrupt, or 
physica.l:ly or mentally disabled. In other words, prior to the 
distress sale policy, the FCC entertained a "Petition for Special 
Relief" permitting a licensee in violation of its rules to sell 
its station without invoking the FCC's revocation procedures. In 
sum, in exceptional circumstances the Commission has exercised 
its enforcement powers to avoid revocation hearings by Petitions 
for Special Relief, or by its distress sale policy. 
The distress sale policy of the FCC has recently come under 
scrutiny based on constitutional concerns that this policy 
if See, Policy Statement, 42 RR 2d 1689 (1978) ("Policy 
Statement" ) • 
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discriminates against non-minorities. We think that such claims 
of discrimination are inconclusive. We further believe that the 
focus on distress sale cases should, indeed, must be on the 
benefit, if a~ to the non-minority licensee prior to and after 
, 
the implementation of the distress sale policy. 
The distress sale policy grew out of a dual recognition by 
the FCC that it could affect greater diversity in the marketplace 
through a distress sale policy tied to its enforcement authority. 
This mixed objective was thought to be well within the public 
interest mandate prescribed by Congress in 1934 when the 
Communications Act was adopted. Under the distress sale ptilicy, 
the public interest was intended to be served by aiding minority 
entrance into the marketplace and to ease the burden of the exit 
of non-minorities by sparing them from the death penalty -- the 
revocation of their license. 
He~ce, from its inception, one of the dual objectives of the 
distress sale policy was to provide direct relief to non-
minorities. Now, how did this policy directly aid non-
minorities? The policy allowed the non-minority to exit his/her 
existing broadcast business without a costly hearing and 
per.mitted the non-minority licensee to salvage 75% or less of 
fair market value in the sale of their broadcast property. This 
was an economically beneficial policy for non-mino#ities because 
it permitted them to avoid administrative costs by bypassing a 
revocation hearing and by being able to reap a profit of up to 
75% or less of fair market value. In fact, non-minorities 
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affirmatively sought and gained a clarification from FCC to make 
the application of the distress sale policy retroactive. A copy 
of the Clarification of Distress Sale Policy (FCC 78-725), and· 
the FCC News Re~ease, both dated October 11, 1978, are submitted 
for the record of these proceedings. 
For those who would argue that the distress sale policy is 
not significant because only 38 licenses have been assigned since 
1978 pursuant to the policy, this fact may be reflective of the 
Commission's failure to execute its enforcement authority as it 
pertains to designating licenses for hearing at renewal time. 
In creating another exception to the rule that assignment 
applications not be granted when there are unresolved 
qualifications issues aqainst the licensee, the FCC has not 
created a constitutionally impermissible criteria based on race, 
rather it has created an enforcement tool that benefits 
minorit~~s and non-minorities. Therefore, it is imperative that 
we consider why Shurberq might be wrongly decided. The pro-
majority' enforcement policy must be taken into account in an 
analysis of Shurberg. In granting the assignment of licenses 
without a hearing on the unresolved qualifications issues, the 
Commission essentially conceived a remedy to what they apparently 
viewed as a problem that needed solving. The Commiesion's 
enforcement discretion was clearly articulated in tpe Policy 
Statement, where the Commission stated: 
U ••• in order to further encourage broadcasters to seek 
out minority purchasers, we will permit licensees whose 
licenses have been designated for revocation hearing, 




hearing on basic qualifications issues, but before the 
hearing is initiated, to transfer or assign their 
licenses at a "di,stress sale" price ••• " 
Policy Statement at 1695. 
The distre#s sale policy is constitutionally per.missible 
J 
because it ben&~its minorities and non-minorities equally. 
,. 
